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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FREE SPEECH AND GENETICALLY 
MODIFIED FOOD LABELING: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR 
DETERMINING THE CONTROVERSIAL CHARACTER OF 
COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
Richard W. Keidel * 
Food is an inextricable ingredient of life.  Today, food 
manufacturers use modes of genetic modification to produce 
foodstuffs.  As a result of the citizenry’s increased awareness of 
this fact, states are requiring food manufacturers to disclose 
which of their products are genetically modified.  However, 
within the context of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, state-mandated labeling of genetically modified 
food stands on an infirm foothold.  The constitutionality of 
these disclosure requirements turns on whether state-mandated, 
genetically modified food labels are uncontroversial.  
Moreover, under the commercial speech doctrine, it is unclear 
how a court should assess and what a court should examine to 
determine whether compelled commercial speech is 
controversial.  This Note proposes that (1) a court should 
examine the speech’s tendency to advance a controversial 
ideology, and (2) a court can assess the speech’s tendency to 
advance a controversial ideology by determining if the speech is 
relevant to a normative value and whether the speech’s 
normative force outweighs its informative force.  This Note 
concludes that state-mandated, genetically modified food labels 
are controversial; therefore, the commercial speech doctrine’s 
more lenient form of means-end scrutiny is inapposite in 
analyzing state disclosure requirements that concern genetically 
modified food. 
INTRODUCTION 
Spensley Rickert and his wife live in the Pioneer Valley.1  Like 
   *      B.A., Philosophy, Washington College, 2012; J.D. Candidate, Western New 
England University School of Law, 2016. This Note is dedicated to my late father, 
Richard J. Keidel, Esq., whose dedication to law and family inspires me every day. 
Many thanks to Taylor Flynn for her guidance and mentorship, and to Jeanne Kaiser 
for her comments on an earlier draft of this Note. Also, special thanks to the editors 
and staff of Western New England Law Review, particularly Dan Benoit, Mark 
Squires, Jessica Scouten, Heather Harris, and Jennifer Weekley.  
  1.  For the basis of this introduction, see Tom Vannah, Between the Lines: 
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many others in the Pioneer Valley, Mr. Rickert is a farmer by 
trade.2  Armed with a degree in agriculture from Cornell and a 
whole lifetime of farming experience, Mr. Rickert operates the 
Hatfield Feed & Seed—a small farm located in North Hatfield, 
Massachusetts, just off of Interstate 91.3  The Hatfield Feed & Seed 
implements environmentally sustainable practices and produces 
organic foodstuffs.4  These two distinct features of the Hatfield 
Feed & Seed are dear not only to Mr. Rickert, but they are also 
important to consumers.5  Mr. Rickert explains that twenty-first 
century consumers are different from those of a bygone era: 
“[t]oday consumers are attuned to labels that indicate, in fairly 
specific terms, how various foodstuffs are produced . . . .”6  In the 
Pioneer Valley, in the greater New England region, and on a 
national level, considerations ranging from health, to food safety, 
to climate change are all driving the focus on food.7 
Consumers are specifically interested in a particular label—the 
genetically modified (“GM”)8 food label.9  However, an 
information divide with respect to food identification allegedly 
Practically Organic, VALLEY ADVOCATE, October 15, 2014, at 7.  “The Pioneer Valley 
region contains three counties in Western Massachusetts with the Connecticut River 
running down the middle.”  RANDY GORDON ET AL., A MONUMENTAL HISTORY OF 
THE PIONEER VALLEY 3 (2009). 
2.  Vannah, supra note 1, at 7. 
3.  Vannah, supra note 1, at 7. 
4.  Id. 
5.  See id. 
6.  Id.  “[L]ocal food is making a comeback; locavores look for locally grown or 
raised food, and other epicurean consumers seek organic and naturally produced 
food.”  David J. Berg, Food Choice Is A Fundamental Liberty Right, 9 J. FOOD L. & 
POL’Y 173, 175 (2013). 
7. See ALEX RIGLEY SCHROEDER, MASSACHUSETTS WORKFORCE ALLIANCE, 
LOCAL FOOD, LOCAL JOBS: JOB GROWTH AND CREATION IN THE PIONEER VALLEY 
FOOD SYSTEM, 11 (Deborah Mutschler, Feb. 2013), 
http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/agr/boards-commissions/mwa-food-report-03062013-
screen.pdf [http://perma.cc/55EQ-BF6X]. 
8. A note on terminology: this Note will employ the full term “genetic 
modification” as a noun, and “GM” as an adjective, e.g., GM tomatoes. 
9. Genetic modification is “[t]he alteration of an organism’s genome by human 
intervention, by introducing, modifying, or eliminating specific genes.”  PAMELA C. 
RONALD & RAOUL W. ADAMCHAK, TOMORROW’S TABLE: ORGANIC FARMING, 
GENETICS, AND THE FUTURE OF FOOD 172 (2008).  See James Maryanski, Testimony 
before the H. Subcomm. on Basic Scientific Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION (Oct. 19, 1999), 
http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/testimony/ucm115032.htm [http://perma.cc/B37H-
CKMM] (last updated Aug. 06, 2009) (“The United States uses the term genetic 
modification to refer to all forms of breeding, both modern, i.e., genetic engineering, 
and conventional.”). 
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sunders the symbiotic relationship between food producers and 
consumers.10  As consumers prowl the aisles of the local grocery 
store, it can be difficult to differentiate GM foodstuffs from non-
GM foodstuffs.11  As a result, Massachusetts’s voters took political 
action in order to ameliorate the information divide. 
On January 13, 2015, several Massachusetts politicians filed a 
GM food-labeling bill, House Bill 369, in the Massachusetts 
legislature for the 2015–2016 legislative season.12  The bill has four 
chief sponsors—two of the four, Representatives Ellen Story and 
Todd Smola, speak on behalf of the Pioneer Valley.13  Moreover, 
House Bill 369 is specifically modeled after Vermont’s GM food-
labeling law,14 which is currently fraught with legal opposition by 
food producers and members of the biotechnology community.  
Thus, Massachusetts should expect substantially similar legal 
challenges if or when House Bill 369 becomes law. 
In the litigation concerning Vermont’s GM food-labeling law, 
food producers and members of the biotechnology community 
claim violations of their free speech rights under the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.15  One of the 
pivotal issues concerning this claim is whether government-
mandated labeling of GM foodstuffs is uncontroversial commercial 
speech.  This inquiry could be a double-edged blade—not only 
could it determine the applicable mode of means-end scrutiny,16 but 
the applicable mode of means-end scrutiny could be determinative 
of the constitutionality of Vermont’s GM food-labeling law.17  
10.  See Berg, supra note 6, at 175.  
11. However, non-GM foodstuffs need not necessarily be “organic.”  See Miles 
McEvoy, Organic 101: Can GMOs Be Used in Organic Products?, U.S. DEP’T OF 
AGRIC. (May 17, 2013, 1:20 PM), http://blogs.usda.gov/2013/05/17/organic-101-can-
gmos-be-used-in-organic-products/ (setting out the standard for organic products).  
12.  H.D. 369, 189th Gen. Court (Mass. 2015); see also GMO Labeling Bill Just 
Introduced in New Legislative Session: Help Recruit Co-sponsors, MA RIGHT TO 
KNOW GMOS (Jan. 13, 2015), http://marighttoknow.com/home/newsession 
[http://perma.cc/MJQ3-57AD].  
13. Fact Sheet, Massachusetts GMO Labeling Legislation, MASSACHUSETTS 
COALITION FOR GMO LABELING 2 (Jan. 14, 2015), http://marighttoknow.com/ 
home/legislative-support/ma-legislation/ [http://perma.cc/JG9E-CGHE]. 
14.  Id. 
15. See Complaint, Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-cv-00117-cr (D.Vt. 
June 12, 2014), ECF No. 1. 
16. “Means-end scrutiny is an analytical process involving examination of the 
purposes (ends) which conduct is designed to serve and the methods (means) chosen to 
further those purposes.”  Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Means-End Scrutiny in American 
Constitutional Law, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 449, 449 (1988).  
17. See, e.g., Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996) 
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 Moreover, the doctrine on this issue is unsettled; “it is unclear 
how [a court] should assess and what [a court] should examine to 
determine whether a mandatory disclosure is controversial.”18  This 
Note adds to the literature on this topic in two ways.19  First, this 
Note pinpoints the substance that a court should examine in 
determining whether compelled commercial speech is 
controversial.  Second, by drawing on concepts from the Federal 
Rules of Evidence and building upon Professor Ellen Goodman’s 
“germaneness requirement,”20 this Note offers an analytical tool to 
determine whether compelled commercial speech is controversial.  
The guiding forces behind this Note’s analysis are the constitutional 
value at the heart of the commercial speech doctrine and the 
scientific and societal factors that make GM foods a hot-button 
topic. 
Part I of this Note discusses the broad principles that underpin 
the debate surrounding GM foods.  Specifically, Part I.A. discusses 
the relevant scientific principles and historical context behind GM 
food.  Part I.B sets out and analyzes the statutory framework of 
Vermont’s GM food-labeling law, the same legislation upon which 
House Bill 369 is based. 
Part II briefly sketches the important constitutional principles 
that underpin the legal dispute over state-mandated GM food 
labeling.  Part II.A. provides the theoretical justifications for the 
free speech guarantee.  Part II.B. discusses the doctrinal principles 
surrounding the free speech guarantee and commercial speech. 
Part II.C. asserts that GM food labeling is compelled commercial 
speech, and is thereby afforded some degree of constitutional 
protection under the free speech guarantee.  Part II.D. discusses 
the primary modes of means-end analysis that are applicable to 
commercial speech, and analyzes why the distinction between the 
two forms of scrutiny is important for GM food-labeling laws. 
Part III sets out the gravamen of this Note.  Specifically, Part 
III.A. argues that a GM food label is purely factual compelled 
commercial speech, and therefore satisfies the first threshold 
requirement for less exacting judicial scrutiny.  Part III.B. argues 
(holding that Vermont could not compel dairy producers to disclose whether their 
products contain rGBH, a type of GM hormone). 
18. Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
19. See Ellen P. Goodman, Visual Gut Punch: Persuasion, Emotion, and the 
Constitutional Meaning of Graphic Disclosure, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 513, 568 (2014) 
(There is little scholarship on compelled commercial speech). 
20.  Id. at 553.  
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that GM food labeling is not uncontroversial compelled 
commercial speech, and therefore fails to satisfy the second 
threshold requirement for less exacting judicial scrutiny.  This Part 
also pinpoints the substance that a court should examine in 
determining whether compelled commercial speech is 
controversial, and offers an analytical mechanism for evaluating the 
relevant substantive information. 
I. SCIENCE, HISTORY, AND STATUTES 
To properly appreciate this Note’s proposal, it is necessary to 
examine the scientific principles of genetic modification and the 
relevant historical development of genetic modification. 
A. Scientific Principles & Historical Context 
Humans have used rudimentary methods of genetic 
modification to produce food for thousands of years.21  For 
instance, the prehistoric inhabitants of the Balsas River basin in 
Mexico developed modern corn (maize) from teosinte, a wild, 
stone-like form of grass, about nine thousand years ago.22  In so 
doing, these early farmers would choose teosinte that had superior 
kernel quality, large size and better taste, then save and plant their 
seeds for future harvest.23 
This ancient process, which is known as artificial selection, is 
man’s first known feat of genetic modification.24  Due to our long 
history of artificially shaping organisms for consumption,25 “[m]any 
of our common crops—including rice, wheat, corn, and beans—
cannot reproduce themselves without human help . . . .”26  Thus, 
humans have a long-rooted, symbiotic relationship with food by 
virtue of our historical use of artificial selection.  It is of no surprise 
that Charles Darwin devoted the entire first chapter of On the 
21. Brooke Glass-O’Shea, The History and Future of Genetically Modified 
Crops: Frankenfoods, Superweeds, & the Developing World, 7 J. FOOD. L. & POL’Y 1, 
3 (2011). 
22. Nina V. Redoroff, Prehistoric GM Corn, 302 SCIENCE, NEW SERIES, no. 
5648, Nov. 14, 2003, at 1158, 1158–59; The Evolution of Corn, UNIV. UTAH HEALTH 
SCIENCES, http://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/selection/corn/ [http://perma.cc/ 
UFK6-KKQF] (last visited Oct. 1, 2015).   
23.  Redoroff, supra note 22, at 1158.  
24.  Id. 
25. Glenn Davis Stone, The Anthropology of Genetically Modified Crops, 39 
ANN. R. ANTHROPOL. 381, 383 (2010).  
26.  Glass-O’Shea, supra note 21, at 3. 
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Origin of Species to this process.27 
The advent of modern science has advanced humans’ ability to 
alter the genetic makeup of organisms.  In general, genetic 
modification refers to distinct subcategories of modalities that 
scientists use to alter organisms for future consumption.28  One 
subcategory of genetic modification is genetic engineering, which 
“involves making an intentional targeted change in a plant or 
animal gene sequence to effect a specific result . . . through the use 
of recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (rDNA) technology.”29  
Genetic engineering was developed in the early-1970s, when 
Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer discovered the process of gene-
splicing or recombinant-DNA modification.30  Genetic 
engineering’s first breakthrough was the therapeutic drug Humulin, 
a form of insulin that is regularly taken by diabetics worldwide.31  
The first foodstuff produced by means of genetic engineering was 
the Flavr Savr tomato, which was approved by the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration in 1994.32  Flavr Savr’s genetic modification 
was a significant breakthrough because the modification delayed 
rotting and increased flavor.33 
Another subcategory of genetic modification is biotechnology, 
which encompasses contemporary methods of modification, such as 
somatic hybridization (protoplast fusion), embryo rescue, 
somaclonal variation, mutation breeding, and cell selection.34  
Specifically, protoplast fusion is a process whereby “cells growing 
in a culture medium are stripped of their protective walls, usually 
using pectinase, cellulase, and hemicellulase enzymes. These 
stripped cells, called protoplasts, are pooled from different sources 
and, through the use of varied techniques such as electrical shock, 
are fused with one another.”35  The resulting plant has 
27. Jeffrey K. Connor, Artificial Selection: A Powerful Tool for Ecologists, 84 
ECOLOGY 1650, 1650 (2003). 
28. SAFETY OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS, COMM. ON IDENTIFYING 
& ASSESSING UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS ON 
HUMAN HEALTH, INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L 
ACADS. 18 (2004). 
29.  Id.  
30.  Glass-O’Shea, supra note 21, at 8. 
31.  Id. 
32. See Stone, supra note 25, at 382.  See also Premarket Notice Concerning 
Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706, 4707–08 (proposed Jan. 18, 2001) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 192 & 592) (discussing the Flavr Savr tomato).  
33.  See Stone, supra note 25, at 382.  
34.  SAFETY OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS, supra note 28, at 18, 24–28. 
35.  Id. at 26. 
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characteristics from both parents—protoplast fusion is 
hybridization at the vegetative level.36  Although it is not the most 
precise methods of modern genetic modification,37 protoplast 
fusion is viewed as a viable method of genetic modification for 
some industries.38  For instance, it is sometimes used in the 
production of tobacco.39 
Another subcategory of genetic modification is conventional 
breeding, which denotes “traditional methods of breeding, or 
crossing, plants, animals, or microbes with certain desired 
characteristics for the purpose of generating offspring that express 
those characteristics.”40  For instance, artificial selection is a form of 
conventional breeding.41  Seeds from a plant with desirable 
characteristics are preserved for future harvest; thus, the crops of 
the future harvest tend to possess the superior characteristics of the 
progenitor plant.42  Despite its vintage, modern technology has 
helped enhance artificial selection’s productivity.43 
 Unsurprisingly, American farmers began cultivating GM 
crops with beneficial traits, such as, herbicide tolerance and insect 
resistance.44  Despite the benefits of GM crops for farmers, 
consumers became quite skeptical of GM food production and 
consumption over the last decade.45 
B. The Statutory Framework: Vermont’s GM Food-Labeling Law 
General skepticism of GM food is not uncommon in American 
36.  Laszlo Menczel et al., Effect of Radiation Dosage on Efficiency of 
Chloroplast Transfer By Protoplast Fusion in Nicotiana, 100 GENETICS 487, 487 (1982).  
37. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 
22984 (May 29, 1992) (“Mutagenesis techniques are limited, however, by their inability 
to target a desired trait.”). 
38. See Menczel et al., supra note 36, at 487 (“Protoplast fusion offers the 
possibility of one-step transfer of organelles between plant species, replacing the 
tedious procedure involving repeated back-crosses.”).  
39.  Id. 
40.  SAFETY OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOODS, supra note 28, at 24. 
41.  See id. 
42.  See id.  
43.  See id. 
44.  See Stone, supra note 25, at 382.  
45.    Anton E. Wohlers, Regarding Genetically Modified food: Policy Trajectories, 
Political Culture, & Risk Perceptions in the U.S., Canada & EU, 29 POL. & LIFE SCI. 
17, 23 (2010).  “Concerns have focused on the capacity of genetically modified foods to 
cross biological boundaries, causing harm to humans and the environment.  However, 
resistance also stems from the post-material values movement of the 1960s and 
1970s . . . .”  Id. at 17.  
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society.46  A logical outgrowth of society’s suspicion is the specific 
issue of government-mandated labeling of GM foodstuffs.47  Before 
House Bill 369 was introduced in Massachusetts, the citizenry of 
Vermont expressed its will on the issue of GM food labeling by 
means of the democratic process.48  Moreover, title 9, sections 3041 
through 3048 of the Vermont Statutes Annotated (“labeling law”) 
codify Vermont’s labeling requirements for GM foods.49  Five 
aspects of the labeling law are particularly relevant for this Note’s 
discussion. 
First, the operative term of Vermont’s labeling law is genetic 
engineering.50  For purposes of the labeling law, genetic 
engineering is (1) a process, (2) by which a foodstuff that is 
intended for human consumption is produced, (3) from an 
organism, and (4) the organism’s genetic material has been 
changed through the application of either (A) “in vitro nucleic acid 
techniques,” (B) cell fusion, or (C) “hybridization techniques that 
overcome natural physiological, reproductive, or recombination 
barriers.”51 
Note well—the labeling law’s definition of genetic engineering 
sits in contrast to the more narrow definition of genetic 
engineering.52  But, as a matter of black letter law, “when a 
legislature defines the language it uses, its definition is binding . . . 
even though the definition does not coincide with the ordinary 
meaning of the words.”53  In this vein, a word is merely “the skin of 
a living thought”; a word’s meaning can vary depending on the 
circumstances in which it is used.54  Hence, what matters most is the 
46. See id.; see also Glass-O’Shea, supra note 21, at 16 (questioning citizens’ 
fright of GM foods). 
47. See Travis Nunziato, “You Say Tomato, I Say Solanum Lycopersicum 
Containing Beta-ionone and Phenylacetaldehyde”: An Analysis of Connecticut’s GMO 
Labeling Legislation, 69 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 471, 481 (2014) (“[T]he labeling of 
genetically modified food is of great interest to consumers in the United States.”). 
48. George A. Nation III, We the People: The Consent of the Governed in the 
Twenty-First Century: The People’s Unalienable Right to Make Law, 4 DREXEL L. 
REV. 319, 329 (2012) (stating that the only legitimate source of governmental power is 
the people).  “In a representative democracy, the people do not exercise their power to 
govern directly; rather, they periodically delegate their authority to an agent or 
representative.” Id. 
49.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 3041–48 (2014) (effective July 1, 2016). 
50.  See id. § 3042(4)(A)–(B). 
51.  Id. 
52.  See discussion supra Part I.A.  
53.  1A NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 20:8 (7th ed. 2007). 
54. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).  
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flesh behind the skin—in this case, the intent of the legislature.55  
The labeling law’s definition of genetic engineering is conceptually 
congruent to the United States’ conception of genetic 
modification.56  In light of this similarity, the intent of the Vermont 
legislature is clear; notwithstanding the use of the term genetic 
engineering, the labeling law’s operative term codifies the essential 
meaning of genetic modification. 
Second, if a foodstuff meets the labeling law’s definition of 
genetic engineering, and it is offered for retail sale in Vermont, the 
foodstuff must be labeled as either produced entirely or in part 
from genetic engineering.57  The duty of actually labeling the 
foodstuff falls upon either the manufacturer or the retailer.58  Food 
manufacturers are obligated to append the required label to the 
packaging of both “raw agricultural commodities” and “processed 
food.”59  On the other hand, food retailers are required to comply 
with the labeling law only in the case of a raw agricultural 
commodity that is not separately packaged.60  In such a 
circumstance, the retailer of the food product is obligated to affix 
the required label to “the retail store shelf or bin in which the 
commodity is displayed for sale . . . .”61  Food retailers who prepare 
food for immediate consumption, such as restaurants, are not 
subject to the labeling law.62 
Third, certain foods need not be labeled: “food consisting 
entirely of or derived entirely from an animal that has not itself 
been produced with genetic engineering”;63 processing aids and 
enzymes;64 alcoholic beverages;65 processed foods that contain 
55. See Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928) 
(stating that it would be arbitrary to interpret a statute in a way that is contrary to 
legislative intent that is supported by persuasive evidence).  
56. James Maryanski, Testimony before the H. Subcomm. on Basic Scientific 
Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 19, 1999), http://www.fda.gov/ 
newsevents/testimony/ucm115032.htm [http://perma.cc/B37H-CKMM] (last updated 
Aug. 06, 2009) (explaining that “[t]he United States uses the term ‘genetic 
modification’ to refer to all forms of breeding, both modern, i.e., genetic engineering, 
and conventional”); see also supra Part I.A. 
57.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 3043(a)(1)–(2). 
58.  Id. §§ 3043(b)(1)–(3). 
59. Id. §§ 3043(b)(1)–(3); see id. § 3042(10) (defining “raw agricultural 
commodity”); id. § 3042(8) (defining “processed food”).   
60.  Id. § 3043(b)(2). 
61.  Id. 
62.  Id. §§ 3043(d)(1)–(2).   
63.  Id. § 3044(1). 
64.  Id. § 3044(3). 
65.  Id. § 3044(4).  
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materials that, in the aggregate, account for no more than 0.9 
percent of the processed food’s total weight;66 and “medical food.”67 
Fourth, the labeling law has four purposes.68  Food 
manufacturers or retailers must provide information regarding GM 
food so that consumers can make informed commercial decisions in 
light of (1) the potential health effects of GM food, (2) the 
potential environmental effects of producing GM food, (3) certain 
religious objections to the use and consumption of GM food, and 
(4) the risk of consumer confusion and deception.69 
On June 12, 2014, the Grocery Manufacturers Association 
(“GMA”) filed suit for injunctive relief in federal district court 
against Attorney General Sorrell (“Vermont”).70  GMA claims that 
the Vermont labeling law is unconstitutional on several grounds.71  
Specifically, GMA asserts that the labeling law contravenes the 
First Amendment by unconstitutionally regulating commercial 
speech.72  To fully appraise the gravity of this claim, this Note will 
analyze the constitutional principles that underpin the legal dispute 
over government-mandated labeling of GM foodstuffs. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
The First Amendment to the Federal Constitution guarantees 
the right of free speech.73  The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the free speech guarantee 
against the several states.74  “The authors of the First Amendment 
knew that novel and unconventional ideas might disturb the 
complacent, but they chose to encourage a freedom which they 
believed essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph 
66.  Id. § 3044(5).   
67.  Id. § 3044(8); 21 U.S.C. § 360ee(b)(3) (2012) (defining “medical food”). 
68.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 3041(1)–(4). 
69.  Id. 
70. See Terri Hallenbeck, Vermont Defends GMO Labeling Law, BURLINGTON 
FREE PRESS, http://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/story/news/politics/2014/08/08/gmo-
lawsuit-response/13800873/ [http://perma.cc/4NWR-MYNU] (last visited Oct. 1, 2015) 
(discussing the lawsuit that was filed against the State of Vermont in May 2014).   
71.  See Complaint at 13–21, Grocery Man. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-cv-00117-cr 
(D. Vt. June. 12, 2014), ECF No. 1.   
72.  See id. at 13–16. 
73.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
74.  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 
U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937) (“[Freedom of speech is] implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the 
states.”). 
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over slothful ignorance.”75  In this light, the right of free speech 
encompasses both the rights of speakers and listeners.76  
Specifically, speakers enjoy the right to speak and the right against 
being compelled to speak.77  Both rights are corollaries of the 
broader concept of individual freedom of mind.78  Moreover, 
listeners enjoy the right to receive speech.79  The right to receive 
speech is just as important as the right to speak at all—“[t]he 
dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing 
addressees are not free to receive and consider them.”80  Even 
before the ratification of the First Amendment in 1791, scholars, 
jurists, and lawyers have sought to pinpoint the purpose of the right 
of free speech.81 
A. Theoretical Justifications for the Free Speech Guarantee 
Today, there are “three classic free speech theories” that 
account for the purpose of the free speech guarantee.82  First, the 
“‘marketplace of ideas’ theory”83 justifies the right of free speech 
on the basis that: 
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in 
ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to 
get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that 
truth is the only ground upon which [peoples’] wishes safely can 
be carried out.84 
In essence, the marketplace of ideas theory rests on the supposition 
that free speech leads to the discovery of truth.85 
75.  Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).  
76.  Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled 
Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 966 (2009).  
77.  Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). 
78.  Id. 
79.  Martin, 319 U.S. at 143.  
80.  Lamont v. Postmaster General of U.S., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., 
concurring).  For a discussion of the right against compelled listening, which is 
currently an unrecognized right under the free speech guarantee, see Corbin, supra 
note 76, at 980 (arguing that the courts should recognize a First Amendment right 
against compelled listening).  
81.  RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A 
TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 1.04 (1994) (discussing Blackstone’s narrow 
conception of freedom of speech).   
82.  Id. § 2.01.   
83.  Id.  
84. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); 
see also Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2288 (2012). 
85.  FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15–16 
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Second, the “‘democratic self-governance’ theory”86 justifies 
the right of free speech on the ground that it “[i]s a necessary 
component of a society premised on the assumption that the 
population at large is sovereign.”87  By making possible an 
informed electorate, and encouraging citizens to participate in the 
political process, the right of freedom of speech fosters “the 
formation of public opinion [which] is vital to the legitimacy of the 
democratic state.”88  In essence, the democratic self-governance 
theory rests on the supposition that “[d]emocracy subordinates 
government to public opinion.”89 
Third, the “‘human dignity and self-fulfillment’ theory” 
justifies the right of free speech on the ground that it promotes 
individual autonomy.90  Identifying individual autonomy as the 
theoretical centerpiece of the free speech guarantee implicitly 
recognizes the ultimate sanctity of individual choice and 
expression.91  In essence, the human dignity and self-fulfillment 
theory rests on the supposition that the right of free speech protects 
“the inner life that [speech] expresses.”92  Nevertheless, these three 
theories “should be understood, however, not as mutually 
exclusive, but as mutually supportive rationales which combine to 
make an overwhelming case for the elevation of freedom of speech 
as a transcendent value in an open society.”93  The free speech 
guarantee encompasses a broad array of constitutionally protected 
rights for both speakers and listeners, and the theoretical 
justifications for the free speech guarantee are manifold.  Despite 
the free speech guarantee’s expansive protections and sundry 
philosophical justifications, it is beyond dispute that “[n]ot every 
case is a first amendment case.”94  “Thus, only a certain category of 
behavior is covered by the first amendment.”95  Next, this Note will 
examine whether GM food labels fall within the category of 
(1982).  
86.  SMOLLA, supra note 81, § 2.01. 
87.  SCHAUER, supra note 85, at 35.   
88.  Corbin, supra note 76, at 970. 
89.    See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM 35 (2012). 
90.  Corbin, supra note 76, at 970–71; see also SMOLLA, supra note 81, § 2.01. 
91.  SCHAUER, supra note 85, at 68. 
92. Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1298 
(2014); see also Corbin, supra note 76, at 972. 
93.  SMOLLA, supra note 81, § 2.01.  
94. Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three 
Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 267 (1981).  
95.  Id.  
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behavior that the First Amendment protects. 
B. Determining the Correct Category 
The free speech guarantee protects “speech as such.”96  This is 
an extremely broad category—constitutional protection attaches to 
any communicative act “whenever an intent to convey a 
particularized message was present, and in the surrounding 
circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it.”97  By implication, “the 
constitutional definition of the word ‘speech’ carves out a category 
that is not coextensive with the ordinary language meaning of the 
word ‘speech.’”98  The critical principle in this respect is that “[t]he 
First Amendment affords protection to symbolic or expressive 
conduct as well as to actual speech.”99 
In general, a communicative act that comes within the free 
speech guarantee’s purview can be the subject of government 
regulation only if the government satisfies strict scrutiny.100  
However, not all speech regulations are categorically subject to 
strict scrutiny—there are several exceptions to the general rule.101  
For purposes of this Note, the most important genus consists of 
speech that is characterized as either low value or devoid of any 
protection.102  Specifically, this category consists of “certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and 
punishment of which has never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem.”103  Examples include “fighting words,”104 
96. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 478 (1997) (Souter, 
J., dissenting).   
97.  Robert C. Post, Essay, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 1249, 1251 (1995) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974)). 
98. Schauer, supra note 94, at 273; see id. at 269 (recognizing that, in general, 
constitutional language is a form of technical language that should be interpreted in its 
unique context and with reference to its particular purposes).   
99.  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003). 
100. See Matthew D. Bunker et al., Strict in Theory, But Feeble in Fact? First 
Amendment Strict Scrutiny and the Protection of Speech, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 349, 
351 (2011).  
101.  Id. at 357 (explaining that strict scrutiny is not applicable if (1) the speech 
regulation is classified as content neutral, (2) the regulated speech is characterized as 
either “low value or devoid of any protection,” (3) the declarant of the speech is 
treated as a “second-class citizen,” or (4) the speech regulation is deemed “to be one of 
general applicability such that any restriction on speech is merely incidental). 
102.  See id. at 360–62 (discussing low value speech and speech that is devoid of 
constitutional protection). 
103.  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
104.  Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).  
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“true threats,”105 “advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent 
lawless action,”106 obscenity,107 child pornography,108 etc.109  This 
category also encompasses forms of speech that enjoy only a 
limited measure of protection under the free speech guarantee.  
For example, libelous speech is partially protected by the First 
Amendment.110  Like libelous speech, commercial speech is 
currently a second-class First Amendment citizen.111 
Traditionally, commercial speech was beyond the scope of the 
free speech guarantee.112  However, a paradigm shift occurred in 
the Court’s treatment of commercial speech in Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.113  
In Virginia State Board, the Court held, for the first time, that the 
free speech guarantee affords some degree of constitutional 
protection to commercial speech.114  The Court explained that 
commercial speech is “indispensable to the formation of intelligent 
opinions as to how [a free market economy] ought to be regulated 
or altered.”115  On this notion, the Court reasoned that it should 
drape a thin veil of constitutional protection over commercial 
speech due to the informative value of commercial speech to the 
105.  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992). 
106.  United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012). 
107.  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).   
108.  New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765–66 (1982).  
109.  See generally United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) 
(discussing categories of speech that are not protected by the free speech guarantee).  
110.  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that a 
public official can recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to her official 
conduct if she proves that the statement was made with “actual malice”). 
111.  See Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 
830 (2001) (referring to commercial speech as “a second-class First Amendment 
citizen”).  Commercial speech is a second-class citizen in the sense that it is not viewed 
as being as important as other forms of speech, such as political speech.  See Robert C. 
Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 25–26 
(2000) (summarizing the ways by which commercial speech is treated differently from 
“public discourse” for constitutional purposes).  Thus, commercial speech does not 
receive the same degree of constitutional protection as non-commercial speech.  See id. 
at 26–28 (discussing how commercial speech and public discourse are treated 
differently specifically within the context of compelled disclosures). 
112. See Bus. Exec. Move for Viet. Peace v. F.C.C., 450 F.2d 642, 658 n.38 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971) (“Commercial advertising–indeed, any sort of commercial speech–is less 
fully protected than other speech, because it generally does not communicate ideas and 
thus is not directly related to the central purpose of the First Amendment.”).  
113. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 765 (1976). 
114.  Id. at 762. 
115.  Id. at 765. 
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general public.116  With respect to the three theoretical justifications 
for free speech, commercial speech hangs its hat on the democratic 
self-governance theory.117  In this vein, the primary constitutional 
value of commercial speech is the circulation of accurate and useful 
information.118 
In this light, GM food labeling is presumptively within the 
ambit of the free speech guarantee.  However, if GM food labeling 
falls into the commercial speech subcategory, it becomes a First 
Amendment second-class citizen.  The next section of this Note will 
examine the definition of “commercial speech” and whether GM 
food labeling aligns with this definition. 
C. Defining Commercial Speech—Bolger and Common Sense 
The definition of “commercial speech” is opaque.119  Among 
the priorities of the Court, defining the precise contours of 
commercial speech is not one of them.120  However, maintaining an 
opaque conception of “commercial speech” might be a sound 
policy—“the creativity of marketing professionals appears to be 
truly inexhaustible, with new marketing techniques dreamed up 
every day.”121  As a conceptual matter, commercial speech could be 
similar to “hard-core pornography” in the sense that we know it 
when we see it.122  In essence, common sense is an important aid in 
116. See id. at 763 (going so far as to say that the value of commercial speech to a 
consumer “may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most 
urgent political debate”); Post, supra note 111, at 28. 
117. See supra Part II.A. (discussing the theoretical justifications of the free 
speech guarantee); Post, supra note 111, at 27 (describing commercial speech as the set 
of communicative acts about commercial subjects that within a public communicative 
sphere convey information of relevance to democratic decision making). 
118.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
119.  See Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2583, 2592 (2008).  
120.  See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 663–65 (2003) (per curiam) (declining 
to address a “novel First Amendment question[]” regarding “a blending of commercial 
speech, noncommercial speech and debate on an issue of public importance”); see also 
Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, What is Commercial Speech? The Issue Not 
Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1143, 1156 (2004) (clarifying that 
the proper issue before the Court in Nike was the definition of commercial speech). 
121. TAMARA R. PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: 
COMMERCIAL SPEECH IN AMERICA 31 (Univ. of Mich. Press 2013). 
122.  See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I 
shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be 
embraced within that shorthand description . . . .  But I know it when I see it, and the 
motion picture involved in this case is not that.”). See also Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. 
S.E.C., 800 F.3d 518, 521 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“It is easier to discern what the Supreme 
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identifying commercial speech.123 
This is not to say that the Court has not given analytical 
guidance at all.  In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,124 the 
Court identified three factors that tend to identify commercial 
speech.125  The three factors are (1) whether the speech is rendered 
in an advertisement-like format, (2) whether a nexus exists 
between a commercial product and the speech, and (3) whether a 
nexus exists between the economic interests of the speaker and the 
speech.126  The Court elucidated that all three factors need not be 
present for speech to be commercial.127  In addition to these factors, 
the commonsense distinction between speech that does no more 
than propose a commercial transaction and other forms of speech 
remains highly relevant.128 
In light of the second and third Bolger factors, and sheer 
common sense, GM food labeling is patent commercial speech.129  
First, a strong nexus exists between a GM food label and the 
foodstuff upon which it is placed.  To begin, an article that a person 
can use for food or drink, i.e., a foodstuff,130 that is offered for sale 
is a commercial product—once the foodstuff is purchased, it enters 
the flow of interstate commerce.131  In addition, as written or 
printed material that appears on the immediate container of a 
foodstuff,132 a GM food label broadcasts data about the foodstuff to 
Court does not consider ‘commercial speech’ than to determine what speech falls 
within that category.”).  
123.  See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) (“In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First 
Amendment protection, we have not held that it is wholly undifferentiable [sic] from 
other forms.  There are commonsense differences between speech that does no more 
than propose a commercial transaction, and other varieties.” (citations omitted)).   
124.  Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
125.  See id. at 66–67. 
126.  Id. (considering three factors in determining whether “mailings fall within 
the core notion of commercial speech–speech which does ‘no more than propose a 
commercial transaction’”); see also Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 120, at 1147–48 
(applying the Bolger factors to the facts of Nike).   
127.  Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66–67 n.14.  
128.  See Va. State Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 771, n.24.  
129.  See Goodman, supra note 19, at 518 (“Product labels are commercial 
speech.”).  
130.  See 21 U.S.C. § 321(f) (2012) (defining “food”). 
131.  See United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 442 (D.D.C. 1968) (stating that 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is a valid exercise of the commerce power).   
132.  See 21 U.S.C. § 321(k) (2012) (defining “label”).  
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which it relates.133  The broadcasted information can be either true 
or false—either way, for purposes of the second Bolger factor, a 
GM food label’s content is inextricably intertwined with the merits 
(or vices) of the foodstuff.134  The nexus between a GM food label 
and the foodstuff to which it relates is clear; a label conveys 
substantive information about the product that bears the label. 
Second, a strong nexus exists between a GM food label and 
the economic interests of many food producers.  For some food 
producers, GM food labeling yields economic gain.135  Other food 
producers have an economic motivation in protesting mandatory 
GM food labeling, especially in light of the potential for reduced 
sales.136  Thus, GM food labeling implicates the economic interests 
of food producers in either a beneficial or negative way depending 
on the circumstances.  For purposes of the third Bolger factor, the 
fact of the matter is that food producers’ economic interests are 
implicated at all.  The nexus between a GM food label and food 
producers’ economic interests is unambiguous.  In addition to the 
two Bolger factors, common sense bolsters the conclusion that GM 
food labeling is commercial speech—it is part and parcel of a 
proposal to engage in a commercial transaction.137 
The two Bolger factors and common sense support the 
conclusion that GM food labels are commercial speech; this means 
that GM food labeling enjoys only a limited measure of protection 
under the free speech guarantee.  Or in other words, the general 
rule doesn’t apply—a government regulation of commercial speech 
is not subject to strict scrutiny analysis.138  Next, this Note will 
discuss the two alternative modes of means-end scrutiny that courts 
use to analyze commercial speech regulations. 
133.  See, e.g., Fleminger, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 854 F. 
Supp. 2d 192, 203 (D. Conn. 2012) (describing a green tea label that claimed that daily 
consumption of green tea can reduce risk of certain forms of cancer).  
134.  See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 845 F. Supp. 
2d 266, 269 (D.D.C. 2012) (discussing textual warnings that cigarette packages must 
bear to inform consumers of the threat that cigarettes pose to health). 
135.  See, e.g., GMO: Your Right to Know, WHOLE FOODS MARKET, 
http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/gmo-your-right-know [http://perma.cc/LEW3-
9W6N] (last visited Oct. 1, 2015) (labeling all food products sold in its stores that are 
non-GMO).  
136.  See Dan D’Ambrosio, With Vermont in Front, GMO Fight Heats Up, 
BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, June 9, 2013, 2013 WLNR 14164173. 
137.  See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).   
138.  Id. at 771–72 (“The First Amendment, as we construe it today, does not 
prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly 
as well as freely.”).   
64 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:47 
D. Central Hudson and Zauderer 
Over the course of exercising judicial review for more than 
two centuries,139 the judiciary has established several tests to 
enforce constitutional limits on government action.140  Of these 
several tests,141 means-end scrutiny is the most common and 
important form of constitutional analysis—it is “a systematic 
method for evaluating the sufficiency of the government’s 
justification for its conduct.”142  In general, there are several 
different species of means-end scrutiny.143  But specifically within 
the commercial speech context, the default mode of means-ends 
scrutiny is set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Public Service Commission of New York.144  Under Central 
Hudson, a law constitutionally regulates commercial speech if (1) 
the speech is not misleading, (2) the speech concerns lawful 
activity, (3) the government has a “substantial” interest in 
regulating the speech, (4) the law “directly advances” the 
government’s substantial interest and (5) the law is “not more 
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”145  Central 
Hudson’s mode of means-ends scrutiny is described as 
“intermediate scrutiny.”146 
The first two prongs of Central Hudson establish “threshold 
requirements” for the application of First Amendment 
protections.147  With constitutional impunity, the government can 
139.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.  
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret 
that rule.”). 
140.  Russell W. Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law, 
21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 449, 449 (1988). 
141.  See id. at n.2 (listing, inter alia, “the clear and present danger test,” “the 
actual malice test,” and “ad hoc multi-factor balancing tests”).  
142.  Id. at 449. 
143.  See id. at 457–58 (setting out the different “levels” of means-end scrutiny in 
tabular format); Post, supra note 111, at 42 (stating that Central Hudson is the “major 
doctrinal test” within the commercial speech doctrine). 
144.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557 (1980). 
145.  Id. at 564–66; see Galloway, supra note 140, at 456 (“In commercial speech 
cases, the Court requires a showing that government restrictions directly advance a 
‘substantial’ government interest and are necessary.”).   
        146.  Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249 (2010) 
(describing the Central Hudson analysis as intermediate scrutiny); JOHN E. NOWAK & 
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16.31(b) (8th ed. 2010) (same); but 
see Galloway, supra note 140, at 456 (describing the Central Hudson analysis as “sub-
intermediate scrutiny”).  
147.  Post, supra note 111, at 34.   
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regulate commercial speech that does not “inform the public about 
lawful activity.”148  These threshold requirements contemplate the 
constitutional value of commercial speech—the circulation of 
accurate and useful information.149  In order to satisfy the three 
remaining prongs,150 the law need only “directly advance a 
substantial interest in a manner that is not too overinclusive; that is, 
in a manner whose scope is in proportion to the interest served.”151  
A law that regulates GM food labeling, which is commercial 
speech, would presumably have to satisfy Central Hudson’s 
intermediate scrutiny to pass muster under the free speech 
guarantee. 
However, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the 
Supreme Court of Ohio,152 the Court established an alternative to 
Central Hudson—a “less exacting”153 form of means-end scrutiny 
that can apply to a law that compels commercial speech.  In 
Zauderer, plaintiff Philip Q. Zauderer was an attorney who 
practiced criminal defense and personal injury litigation in 
Columbus, Ohio.154  In an attempt to bolster his business, Mr. 
Zauderer placed an advertisement in thirty-six Ohio newspapers in 
the spring of 1982.155  The advertisement broadcasted Mr. 
Zauderer’s willingness to represent—on a contingent-fee basis—
women who incurred personal injuries as a result of using the 
Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device.156  However, the Supreme 
Court of Ohio’s Office of Disciplinary Counsel took exception to 
Mr. Zauderer’s advertisement.157 
In the summer of 1982, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed 
an attorney grievance complaint against Mr. Zauderer.158  The 
complaint alleged, inter alia, that the Dalkon Shield advertisement, 
which advertised legal representation on a contingent-fee basis, 
failed to disclose, in contravention of a then-effective attorney 
148.  Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–64. 
149.  See id. at 563 (stating that the free speech guarantee’s “concern for 
commercial speech is based on the informational function of advertising.”). 
150.  See Post, supra note 111, at 42 (describing the remaining prongs as 
“astonishingly abstract”). 
151.  Id. (citing Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)). 
152.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).  
153.  Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 230 
(2010). 
154.  Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 629–31.  
155.  Id. at 630. 
156.  Id. at 630–31. 
157.  See id.  
158.  Id.  
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discipline rule159 (“the disciplinary rule”), whether the percentage 
of the contingent fee was computed before or after court costs and 
expenses were deducted from the recovered damages, if any.160  
Due to this omission, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel argued 
that “the ad’s failure to inform clients that they would be liable for 
costs (as opposed to legal fees) even if their claims were 
unsuccessful rendered the advertisement ‘deceptive’ in violation of 
[the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility].”161  Before both a 
panel of the Board of Bar Commissioners and the Supreme Court 
of Ohio, Mr. Zauderer unsuccessfully argued that the disciplinary 
rule was unconstitutional under the free speech guarantee.162  Mr. 
Zauderer appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States for 
further review.163 
At the outset, the Court recognized that the issue before it—
whether a state may seek to prevent potential deception of the 
public by requiring attorneys to disclose in their advertising certain 
information regarding fee arrangements—was different from prior 
cases involving commercial speech.164  Rather than restraining 
commercial speech, the disciplinary rule regulated commercial 
speech “by requiring attorneys to disclose in their advertising 
certain information regarding fee arrangements.”165  The Court 
recognized that there are material differences between disclosure 
requirements and outright prohibitions on commercial speech.166  
Because the primary constitutional value of commercial speech is 
the circulation of accurate and useful information, disclosure 
requirements complement this value by adding data to the stream 
of commercial information.167  Thus, the Court held that a 
regulation that compels the disclosure of commercial speech does 
not violate the free speech guarantee when the disclosure consists 
of “purely factual and uncontroversial information” and the 
disclosure is “reasonably related to the State’s interest in 
preventing deception of consumers.”168  The Court concluded that 
the disciplinary rule satisfied this standard, and upheld Mr. 
159.  For the full text of the disciplinary rule, see Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 632 n.4.   
160.  Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 633–34. 
161.  Id.  
162.  Id. at 634–36.  
163.  Id.  
164. Id. at 629 (“This case presents additional unresolved questions regarding the 
regulation of commercial speech . . . .”). 
165.  Id.   
166.  Id. at 650.  
167.  Id. at 651.  
168.  Id.  
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Zauderer’s public reprimand.169 
In the successor case to Zauderer,170 the Court described the 
standard set forth in Zauderer as “less exacting” means-end 
scrutiny (“less exacting scrutiny”).171  On this point, it is paramount 
to understand that less exacting scrutiny is more stringent than 
mere rational basis review—the two forms of means-end scrutiny 
should not be equivocated.172  Judge Kavanaugh of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit elaborated on this 
point in American Meat Institute v. U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, a recent case involving compelled commercial speech: 
When the Supreme Court applies rational basis review, it does 
not attach a host of requirements of the kind prescribed 
by Zauderer.  Rational basis review is extremely deferential and 
in this context would undoubtedly tolerate government 
mandates of moral or policy-laden messages, of controversial 
messages, of burdensome labels, of disclosures that are only 
indirectly related to the Government’s interests.  
Zauderer tolerates none of that.  Zauderer tightly limits 
mandatory disclosures to a very narrow class that meets the 
various Zauderer requirements.173 
The Court’s characterization of Zauderer as less exacting 
scrutiny when compared to Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny 
is appropriate.  Zauderer is less exacting in its analysis of the means 
used by the government to further its interest, most notably in two 
ways.174 
First, Central Hudson requires a commercial speech regulation 
to directly advance the government’s interest.175  Under Zauderer, 
a commercial speech regulation need only be reasonably related to 
the government’s interest.176  Second, by requiring a commercial 
169.  Id. at 652–55.  
170.  Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010); see 
Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (describing 
Milavetz as the Court’s “later application of Zauderer”).   
171.  Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 249. 
172.  Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 33–34 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
173.  Id.; see also Igor Kirman, Standing Apart To Be Apart: The Precedential 
Value of Supreme Court Concurring Opinions, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2084 (1995) 
(“At the minimum, concurrences provide a commentary on the decisions that they 
accompany and may aid lower courts in interpreting and applying such decisions.”). 
174.  See Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 33 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“As I read 
it, the Supreme Court’s decision in Zauderer applied the Central Hudson ‘tailored in a 
reasonable manner’ requirement to compelled commercial disclosures.”). 
175.  Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 564 (1980).  
176.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).   
68 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:47 
speech regulation to be not more extensive than is necessary to 
serve the government’s interest, Central Hudson conditions a 
commercial speech regulation’s constitutionality on the absence of 
a less restrictive alternative for achieving the government’s 
interest.177  On the other hand, Zauderer’s less exacting scrutiny 
does not analyze the availability of less restrictive alternatives.178  
Given these differences, it is no surprise that “recently the Central 
Hudson test has been applied with a severity that borders on strict 
scrutiny.”179  Determining which standard of scrutiny applies to a 
GM food labeling law is where the heart of the legal dispute 
between GMA and the State of Vermont lies, with Vermont 
arguing for less exacting scrutiny under Zauderer.  To satisfy the 
first two prongs of Zauderer, however, a GM food label must be 
both purely factual and uncontroversial. 
III. “PURELY FACTUAL” AND “UNCONTROVERSIAL” 
The government can compel commercial speech by force of 
law.180  However, for the government to invoke the benefit of less 
exacting scrutiny, the compelled commercial speech must be purely 
factual and uncontroversial.181 
A.  GM Food Labels as “Purely Factual” Compelled Commercial   
Speech 
Specifically, the purely factual requirement furthers the 
primary constitutional value underlying the commercial speech 
doctrine.182  By compelling purely factual commercial speech, the 
government furthers the circulation of accurate and useful 
information.183  In contrast, compelled commercial speech that is 
177.  Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.  
178.  Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 n.14 (“Because the First Amendment interests 
implicated by disclosure requirements are substantially weaker than those at stake 
when speech is actually suppressed, we do not think it appropriate to strike down such 
requirements merely because other possible means by which the State might achieve its 
purposes can be hypothesized.”).  
179.  Post, supra note 111, at 42. 
180.  See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 771–72 (1976) (“The First Amendment, as we construe it today does not 
prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly 
as well as freely.”).  
181.  Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651; Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-CV-117, 
2015 WL 1931142, at *29 (D. Vt. Apr. 27, 2015). 
182.  The primary constitutional value of commercial speech is “the circulation of 
accurate and useful information.”  Post, supra note 111, at 28.  
183.  “Because the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial 
speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech 
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non-factual obstructs the commercial speech doctrine’s primary 
constitutional value.184  By compelling non-factual commercial 
speech, the government hampers the circulation of accurate and 
useful information by disseminating government-prescribed 
orthodoxies.185  As a doctrinal matter, compelled commercial 
speech is non-factual if the government’s idiosyncratic value 
judgments serve as the criterion186 against which the subject matter 
of the speech’s content is evaluated.187 
For instance, in Entertainment Software Association v. 
Blagojevich, the Seventh Circuit held that compelled commercial 
speech that addressed the suitability of video games for minors was 
non-factual.188  Specifically, the State of Illinois required video 
game retailers to append a four-inch square label that bore the 
numbers “18” to the packaging of “sexually explicit” video 
games.189  The “18” sticker (the compelled commercial speech) 
communicated to consumers that a video game (the subject matter 
of the speech’s content) that bore the “18” sticker was not 
appropriate for minors (the speech’s content) because it was 
“sexually explicit” (the criterion—an idiosyncratic value judgment).  
In so holding, the Blagojevich court affirmed the lower court’s 
ruling that whether a particular video game is “sexually explicit” is 
inherently “opinion-based.”190 
In Blagojevich, the idiosyncratic value judgments of the State 
of Illinois served as the criterion against which video games were 
provides . . . [Zauderer’s] constitutionally protected interest in not providing any 
particular factual information in his advertising is minimal.”  Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
184.  See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114 n.5 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“Our decision reaches only required disclosure of factual commercial information.  
Requiring actors in the marketplace to espouse particular opinions would likely raise 
issues not presented here.”).   
185.  See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (distinguishing government attempts to 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in matters of opinion and attempts to prescribe what 
shall be orthodox in commercial advertising). 
186.  This Note employs the term “criterion” as meaning “a standard on which a 
decision or judgment may be based” or “a standard of judgment.”  WEBSTER’S NEW 
INT’L DICTIONARY 538 (3d. ed. 2002). 
187.  See generally Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 
2006) aff’g 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. 
Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009); aff’d sub nom. Brown v. Entm’t 
Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).  
188.  Blagojevich, 469 F.3d at 651–53. 
189.  The term “sexually explicit” was defined by statute.  Id. at 643–44. 
190.  Entm’t Software Ass’n, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1081 (“Unlike labeling 
requirements that have been upheld under the commercial speech test, the question 
whether a game is violent or sexually-explicit is a subjective evaluation left to the 
discretion of the retailer.”).  
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assessed.  Conceptions of “sexually explicit” are as manifold as 
conceptions of “beauty,” “justice” or “piety.”  Thus, “sexually 
explicit” lacks a fixed factual meaning because any meaning 
attributable to the term is relative to the opinion of the person 
defining it.191  By implication, communicating that a particular 
video game is inappropriate for minors on the ground that it is 
“sexually explicit” amounts to nothing more than an expression of 
opinion.192  Whether or not Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas is 
“sexually explicit” is entirely in the eye of the player.193 
The Seventh Circuit’s holding is supported on theoretical 
grounds as well; the reasoning in Blagojevich complements the 
marketplace of ideas justification for the free speech guarantee.194  
In the words of Justice Holmes, the theory behind the Constitution 
is that “the best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market . . . .”195  Moreover, when 
the government compels non-factual commercial speech on a given 
topic, the government subordinates the commercial speaker’s 
opinion on the same topic.196  By doing so, the government drives 
highly relevant opinions out of the marketplace of ideas.197  
Thereby, the government insulates the accuracy of the non-factual 
commercial speech from adversarial scrutiny, and covers the non-
factual speech with a thin veil of presumptive utility.  This 
undercuts the primary constitutional value of the commercial 
speech doctrine, since non-factual commercial speech fails to 
materially advance the circulation of accurate and useful 
191.  See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction at 31, Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-cv-00117-cr (D.Vt. Sept. 11, 
2014), ECF No.33-1 (arguing that GM labeling is non-factual commercial speech).   
192.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1267 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “opinion” 
as “[a] person’s thought, belief or inference . . . as opposed to personal knowledge of 
the fact themselves.”).  
193.  To justify the videogame labeling law, the State of Illinois introduced 
screenshots from three videogames: (1) Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas, (2) Leisure 
Suit Larry: Magna Cum Laude, and (3) The Guy Game: Uncut and Uncensored. 
Blagojevich, 469 F.3d at 644. 
194.  See supra Part II.A.  Individuals objectively assess competing opinions to 
determine which one, if any, conveys the “truth” of the matter.  JOHN E. NOWAK & 
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16.6 (d) (8th ed. 2010) (discussing 
Holmes’ “marketplace of ideas”). 
195.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
196.  See Blagojevich, 469 F.3d at 652. 
197.  See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 
447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980) (“[C]ommercial speakers have extensive knowledge of 
both the market and their products.  Thus, they are well situated to evaluate the 
accuracy of their messages and the lawfulness of the underlying activity.”).  
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information. 
In summation, the “18” sticker in Blagojevich was non-factual 
because the idiosyncratic value judgments of the State of Illinois 
served as the criterion against which the subject matter of the 
speech’s content was evaluated.198  Compelling non-factual 
commercial speech frustrates the inner-workings of the 
marketplace of ideas, which thereby obstructs the advancement of 
the commercial speech doctrine’s primary value.  As a result, 
Illinois could not invoke the benefit of Zauderer’s less exacting 
scrutiny; instead, it faced strict scrutiny and the court held that the 
law was unconstitutional.199 
In stark contrast to the “18” sticker, a GM food label is purely 
factual compelled commercial speech.200  The GM food label (the 
compelled commercial speech) communicates to consumers that 
the label-bearing foodstuff (the subject matter of the speech’s 
content) is genetically modified (the speech’s content) because the 
product was produced by means of either in vitro nucleic acid 
techniques or cell fusion or hybridization techniques that overcome 
natural physiological, reproductive, or recombination barriers (the 
criterion).  With respect to Vermont’s labeling law, the 
idiosyncratic value judgments of the State of Vermont do not serve 
as the criterion against which a foodstuff is assessed.  Instead, an 
external body of verifiable knowledge serves as the applicable 
criterion, which is set forth in section 3042(4) of the labeling law.201  
Vermont’s statutory criterion is congruent with the scientific 
understanding of which modes of food production constitute 
methods of genetic modification.202 
Since Vermont’s statutory criterion is congruent to the 
198.  See Blagojevich, 469 F.3d at 652 (stating that the sticker communicates a 
subjective and highly controversial message).  
199.  Id. at 652–53. 
200.  See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 
10–11, Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-cv-00117-cr (D.Vt. Aug. 8, 2014). 
201.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 3042(4)(A)–(B) (defining “genetic engineering”). 
See Jeanne Frazier Price, Wagging, Not Barking: Statutory Definitions, 60 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 999, 1019 (2013) (“By defining terms, statutes create categories into which 
behaviors, entities, individuals, and actions—both present and future—are somehow 
made to fit.”).  
202. James Maryanski, Testimony before the H. Subcomm. on Basic Scientific 
Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION (Oct. 19, 1999), 
http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/testimony/ucm115032.htm [http://perma.cc/B37H-
CKMM] (last updated Aug. 06, 2009) (“the United States uses the term genetic 
modification to refer to all forms of breeding, both modern, i.e., genetic engineering, 
and conventional”).  
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scientific consensus on the matter,203 it has a fixed factual meaning.  
In other words, Vermont’s criterion is different from Illinois’s 
definition of “sexually explicit” because it was not shaped by the 
person defining it.  Instead, Vermont’s criterion is a transplanted 
conception that was shaped by third parties who specialize in the 
areas of concern, namely, genetics and biotechnology.204  
Therefore, within the context of Vermont’s labeling law, GM food 
labeling is purely factual compelled commercial speech.205 
By way of counterargument, it is immaterial that Vermont’s 
criterion encompasses different methods of genetic modification.206  
This feature does not mean that Vermont’s criterion, as a whole, is 
devoid of a fixed factual meaning.207  If anything, Vermont’s 
criterion of genetic modification clarifies the term by providing an 
express analytical framework that breaks down the technical, 
scientific concepts that the term generally includes in common 
parlance.208  Vermont’s criterion breaks down a “lexical chunk” 
into small, digestible concepts, which allows food producers and 
consumers alike to understand and use it for objective assessment 
of food products.209 
In summation, Vermont’s criterion accords with the scientific 
conception of genetic modification—it has fixed, empirical referent 
and is not shaped by subjective value judgments.  In addition, 
Vermont’s criterion allows for an objective evaluation of food 
products that yields black and white answers: a food product is 
either genetically modified or not. GM food labeling communicates 
non-opinion based information about food products intended for 
human consumption.  In stark contrast to Illinois’ “18” sticker in 
203.  See id. 
204.  See id. 
205.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 709 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “fact” as 
“[s]omething that actually exists; an aspect of reality”).   
206.  Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-CV-117, 2015 WL 1931142, at *31 
n.33 (D. Vt. Apr. 27, 2015) (Plaintiffs point to no authority for the proposition that 
speech is misleading when it fails to reflect a party’s preferred definition of a 
statutorily-defined term.). 
207.  See id. (denying plaintiff’s argument that the labeling law is factually 
misleading because there are multiple, plausible definitions of “GE”); see also 
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for a 
Preliminary Injunction at 31, Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-cv-00117-cr 
(D.Vt. Sept. 11, 2014), ECF No.33-1 (arguing that Vermont’s GE definition does not 
have a fixed meaning). 
208.  See Price, supra note 201, at 1024 (explaining that technical terms are 
understood best by means of a conceptual model).  
209.  See id. (discussing that “lexical chunks,” i.e., nuanced technical terms, are 
more difficult to understand than individual words).   
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Blagojevich, GM food labeling is “purely factual” compelled 
commercial speech. 
B. GM Food Labels as Controversial Compelled Commercial 
Speech 
The purely factual requirement is not the only hurdle that the 
government must surmount to invoke the benefit of Zauderer’s less 
exacting scrutiny.  Compelled commercial speech must also be 
uncontroversial (“the uncontroversial requirement”).210  At the 
outset it is important to highlight that, as a matter of legal doctrine, 
the precise contours of the uncontroversial requirement are far 
from clear.211  Judge Kavanaugh made this point clear in American 
Meat Institute: “To be sure, determining whether a disclosure is 
‘uncontroversial’ may be difficult in some compelled commercial 
speech cases, in part because it is unclear how we should assess and 
what we should examine to determine whether a mandatory 
disclosure is controversial.”212  The first section of this part will 
analyze and critique the perspectives of GMA and Vermont 
concerning what a court should examine to determine if the 
uncontroversial requirement is satisfied.213  The second section of 
this part will offer a method to assess compelled commercial speech 
for impermissible controversy. 
1. Substance: What a Court Should Examine 
First, Vermont’s perspective is quite narrow—the court should 
focus on whether empirical evidence supports the existence of the 
disclosed fact.214  From this outlook, compelled commercial speech 
is controversial if it does not convey empirically accurate 
210.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).  
211.  Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
212.  Id. (emphasis added). 
213.  In the end, the district court sustained Vermont’s conception of the 
uncontroversial requirement.  Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-CV-117, 2015 
WL 1931142, at *32 (“Because Act 120’s GE disclosure requirement mandates the 
disclosure of only factual information—whether a food product contains GE 
ingredients—in conjunction with a purely commercial transaction, it does not require 
the disclosure of ‘controversial’ information.”).  
214.  See id. (concluding that the labeling law was uncontroversial because it 
mandates the disclosure of factual information); Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 12, Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. 
Sorrell, No. 5:14-CV-117 (D. Vt. Aug. 8, 2014), ECF No. 24 [hereinafter Defendants’ 
Memorandum of Law](arguing that GM food labeling is uncontroversial because “a 
disclosure that food was produced with genetic engineering—which is all Act 120 
requires—is a true and objective fact.”). 
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information about some discrete aspect of the world.215  “For 
example, if a loaf of bread contains wheat flour, that fact is 
demonstrably provable and not open to value disagreements.  It 
describes an uncontroverted state of being.”216  In essence, from 
Vermont’s perspective, compelled commercial speech that conveys 
a fact that has definitive, rather than mixed, empirical support 
amounts to uncontroversial commercial speech.217 
On the other hand, GMA’s perspective is quite broad—the 
court should focus on whether the disclosed fact advances a 
controversial ideology as opposed to a generally accepted norm.218  
From GMA’s outlook, compelled commercial speech advances a 
controversial ideology when the disclosed fact is “germane” to a 
norm, and the norm to which the disclosed fact is germane is in 
some way contested.219  If the disclosed fact is germane to a 
contested norm, the compelled commercial speech is impermissibly 
controversial.220  Professor Goodman analyzes this perspective 
from the government’s vantage point.  Specifically, when the 
government compels commercial speech, it becomes “a participant 
in information markets, using its regulatory power or spending 
power to get private parties to speak.”221  If the government 
implicitly takes a side about whether the disclosed fact is germane 
to the transaction at hand, the compelled commercial speech is 
215.  See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 214, at 12.  
216.  Dayna B. Royal, Resolving the Compelled-Commercial-Speech 
Conundrum, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 205, 237 (2011) (emphasis added). 
217.  See id. at 238 (“For factual information to be ‘controverted,’ it must have 
mixed empirical support for its existence as an actual state of being.”).  
218.  See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 14, Grocery Mfrs. 
Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-CV-117 (D. Vt. June 12, 2014), ECF No. 1; Plaintiffs’ 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction at 31, Grocery Man. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-cv-00117-cr (D. Vt. Sept. 11, 
2014), ECF No. 33-1 (“[The labeling law] is intended to fuel controversy.”); see also 
Goodman, supra note 19, at 550 (asserting that the unconstitutional requirement 
concerns “disclosures that, even if purely factual, are designed to advance a 
controversial ideology as opposed to a generally accepted norm”). 
219.  See Goodman, supra note 19, at 553–54 (“The work that ‘noncontroversial’ 
does in the advancement of consumer-autonomy interests is to impose a germaneness 
requirement on the state. . . . Limiting Zauderer review to instances in which the 
mandated disclosure is of uncontroversial relevance to consumer purchases would 
serve the same purpose.”). 
220.  See Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion 
for a Preliminary Injunction at 33, Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-CV-117 (D. 
Vt. Sept. 11, 2014), ECF No. 33 (“As one witness put it, mandatory labeling is merely a 
‘shibboleth, for a far larger issue’ about modern agriculture.”); Goodman, supra note 
19, at 553 (construing Zauderer’s “noncontroversial” language to impose a 
“germaneness” requirement on the state). 
221.  Goodman, supra note 19, at 553. 
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impermissibly controversial.222 
For example, a “conflict free” insignia on the packaging of a 
product that typically incorporates “conflict minerals” conveys a 
fact. 223  The fact is that the specific, insignia-bearing product is 
devoid of minerals that are typically extracted from warlord-
controlled mining sites in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.224  
Moreover, the important point is that the conflict free insignia is 
also highly germane to a normative value.  The normative value to 
which the conflict free insignia is germane is that it is impermissible 
for American consumers to condone the war and humanitarian 
catastrophes that have occurred in the Congo through the 
purchasing power of the dollar.225  In this example, the conflict free 
insignia performs two functions—it broadcasts an empirically 
uncontroverted fact, and, because it is germane to a normative 
value that is controversial, it furthers a controversial ideology as 
opposed to a generally accepted norm.226  In sum, GMA’s 
perspective requires a court to examine whether the compelled 
commercial speech is germane to a controversial normative value, 
i.e., whether the disclosed fact advances a controversial ideology.227 
Between the perspectives of Vermont and GMA concerning 
what substantive information a court should examine to determine 
if the uncontroversial requirement is satisfied, GMA’s outlook 
should prevail for two reasons.  First, Vermont’s reading of 
Zauderer is interpretatively unsound.  Second, Vermont’s 
construction is anathema to the primary constitutional value of 
commercial speech.  At the same time, GMA’s perspective 
embraces an evenhanded reading of Zauderer, and it complements 
the primary constitutional value of commercial speech. 
a. Interpretative Issues 
It is important to highlight the interpretive issues surrounding 
222.  Id. at 553–54. 
223.  This example derives from the facts of Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 
359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (overruled on other grounds by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). 
224.  Id. at 362–63 (explaining that armed groups finance the war in the Congo by 
exploiting the country’s trade in gold, tantalum, tin, and tungsten, which are 
colloquially referred to as “conflict minerals”). 
225.  See id. at 371 (holding that the SEC’s disclosure requirement violated the 
First Amendment because it “compell[ed] an issuer to confess blood on its hands”). 
226.  See id. at 373. 
227.  See Goodman, supra note 19, at 549 (“While value may be inextricable from 
fact, that does not mean that the kind and strength of value is irrelevant to First 
Amendment considerations.”). 
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Vermont’s perspective on what courts should examine in 
determining if the uncontroversial requirement is satisfied.  In 
Zauderer, the Court’s holding focused in part on the content of the 
commercial speech; specifically, it sustained the constitutionality of 
the disciplinary rule because the rule provided mere “purely factual 
and uncontroversial information about the terms under which . . . 
services will be available.”228  Vermont’s reading of the latter-
quoted language is interpretatively unsound. 
Specifically, Vermont’s reading of Zauderer is unsound in light 
of two important principles of legal interpretation.  First, when two 
words or phrases are separated by the word “and” in a specific 
sentence, each of the two words or phrases constitutes a discrete 
requirement or element.229  Second, an interpretation that would 
render a word or phrase redundant or meaningless should be 
rejected.230  At the confluence of these two principles lies the sound 
conclusion that Vermont’s perspective is interpretatively unsound. 
Vermont’s reading of Zauderer equivocates the words 
“uncontroversial” and “factual.”231  By doing so, it deprives the 
word “uncontroversial” of actual meaning; in other words, the 
narrow reading of Zauderer renders particular language of the 
Court superfluous and void.232  Since Vermont’s perspective would, 
in essence, write the word “uncontroversial” out of the Court’s 
opinion in Zauderer, it should be rejected.  In addition, Vermont’s 
reading of Zauderer fails to honor the fact that the Court separated 
“purely factual” and “uncontroversial” with the word “and.”  From 
the phraseology used in Zauderer, it is fair to infer that the Court 
intended to establish two discrete and substantively different 
requirements—namely, that compelled commercial speech must be 
both “purely factual” and “uncontroversial” to receive the benefit 
228.  Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) 
(emphasis added). 
229.  Cf. 1A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 53, § 21:14.  
230.  See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 800 F.3d 518, 529 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(explaining that interpreting “purely factual and uncontroversial” as “purely factual 
and accurate” leads to a redundancy).  Cf. 2A NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, 
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:6 (7th ed. 2014) (“It is an elementary 
rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and 
sentence of a statute.”) (citing United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955)).   
231.  See Goodman, supra note 19, at 552 (“In other words, ‘uncontroversial’ is 
synonymous with ‘factual.’” (emphasis added)).  See also Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d 
at 529 n.28 (“Is there such a thing as a ‘purely factual’ proposition that is not 
‘accurate’?”).   
232.  Cf. 2A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 230, § 46:6 (stating that courts 
interpret laws so that no part of the law is either inoperative, superfluous or void).  
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of less exacting scrutiny. 
Vermont’s perspective on what substantive information courts 
should examine in determining if the uncontroversial requirement 
is satisfied runs contrary to the Court’s intent, which can be 
inferred from the phraseology of Zauderer.  As a result, Vermont’s 
outlook results in unnecessary duplicity.  Examining whether the 
disclosed fact conveys uncontroverted information about some 
discrete aspect of the external world is tantamount to investigating 
whether compelled commercial speech is accurate and true, or in 
other words, purely factual.  Vermont’s perspective is unsound. 
b. Constructive Issues 
Most significantly, it is paramount to stress the fact that 
Vermont’s perspective on what substantive information courts 
should examine in determining if the uncontroversial requirement 
is satisfied is injurious to the primary constitutional value of 
commercial speech. In holding that the free speech guarantee 
affords some degree of constitutional protection to commercial 
speech, the Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy reasoned 
that the primary constitutional value of commercial speech is the 
circulation of accurate and useful information.233 
Identifying the circulation of accurate and useful information 
as the primary constitutional value of commercial speech hinges on 
a key presupposition—democracy subordinates government to 
public opinion.234  Specifically, the proper functioning of American 
democracy depends on the citizenry’s access to commercial 
information.235  The grant of constitutional protection to 
commercial speech allows commercial information to freely enter 
the communicative sphere.236  Enabling individuals to tap into a 
vast depository of commercial information cognitively empowers 
the citizenry;237 armed with such information, individuals can voice 
233.  See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 765 (1976); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650–51; Post, supra note 111, at 28 (“For the 
state to mandate disclosures designed more fully and completely to convey information 
is thus to advance, rather than to contradict, pertinent constitutional values.”).  
234.  POST, supra note 89, at 35. 
235.  See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 (“Therefore, even if the First 
Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decision-
making in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information does not 
serve that goal.”) (footnote omitted) (citing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH 
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)).  
236.  See Post, supra note 111, at 25. 
237.  See Martin Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 630 
(1982). 
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competent opinions with respect to the “significant issues of the 
day.”238  It is beyond doubt that an “informed public opinion will 
more intelligently and effectively supervise the government.”239  
Therefore, without competent commercial speech, the citizenry 
would lose its epistemic depth, and when the citizenry could no 
longer touch the bottom, government would go deaf, blind, and 
dumb.240 
Vermont’s perspective eviscerates the presupposition upon 
which the primary constitutional value of commercial speech 
hinges.241  By only examining the empirical accuracy of the 
commercial speech in determining if the uncontroversial 
requirement is satisfied, the government could infuse purely factual 
information that is germane to a highly contested norm into the 
communicative sphere.242  In other words, under Vermont’s theory, 
the government would be at complete liberty to inject the 
particular ideological stance that it endorses into a protracted and 
substantial controversy of public concern.243 
Rather than cognitively empowering the citizenry, purely 
factual compelled commercial speech that is germane to a 
contested norm would shackle the minds of citizens to the 
government’s ideological standpoint.244  In such a case, public 
opinion and government policy would be indistinguishable.  Rather 
than public opinion shaping government action through the 
democratic process, government policy could unilaterally dictate 
public opinion and private action with respect to matters of 
unsettled controversy.245  The Court recognized the problems 
238.  Bates v. St. Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977).  See POST, supra note 89, 
at 40–41 (asserting that commercial speech conveys factual knowledge that “cognitively 
empowers public opinion”).   
239.  POST, supra note 89, at 35. 
240.  ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 122 (1990). 
241.  Identifying the circulation of accurate and useful information as the primary 
constitutional value of the commercial speech doctrine hinges on the premise that 
democracy subordinates government to public opinion.  POST, supra note 89, at 43.  
242.  See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 800 F.3d 518, 529 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(“[A]s Mark Twain wrote, ‘Often, the surest way to convey misinformation is to tell the 
strict truth.’”). 
243.  See id. at 530 n.29. 
244.  See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) 
(explaining that the government cannot “prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or 
act their faith therein” (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
642 (1943)).   
245.  See id. at 651 (emphasizing how government orthodoxy is constitutionally 
impermissible). 
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surrounding such a situation by examining history: 
Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the 
lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out 
Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as 
a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a 
means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our 
present totalitarian enemies. Those who begin coercive 
elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating 
dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the 
unanimity of the graveyard.246 
Vermont does violence to the primary constitutional value of 
commercial speech by endorsing a narrow perspective on what 
substantive information courts should examine in determining if 
the uncontroversial requirement is satisfied.  By undermining 
commercial speech’s primary constitutional value, Vermont’s 
outlook places the proper functioning of American democracy 
much at hazard and maims the autonomy interests of private 
individuals. 
By adopting GMA’s perspective on what substantive 
information courts should examine in determining if the 
uncontroversial requirement is satisfied, a safety valve is 
incorporated into Zauderer’s less exacting scrutiny.  GMA’s 
outlook allows for the free flow of accurate and useful commercial 
information.  At the same time, it also mitigates the potential for 
purely factual compelled commercial speech to be used as a prod 
by the government.  It dampens the possibility that the government 
can use compelled commercial speech to unduly influence the 
thoughts and conduct of citizens with respect to contested social 
issues.  Between the respective outlooks proposed by Vermont and 
GMA, GMA’s perspective on what courts should examine in 
determining if the uncontroversial requirement is satisfied must 
prevail. 
2. Procedure: How a Court Should Assess Compelled 
Commercial Speech 
In the section prior, this Note assessed the two prevailing 
perspectives regarding what substantive information courts should 
examine in determining if compelled commercial speech is 
impermissibly controversial. The section prior argued that GMA’s 
perspective should prevail.  In sum and substance, GMA’s 
246.  W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).  
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perspective focuses on whether the compelled commercial speech, 
even if purely factual, advances a controversial ideology.247  From 
this outlook, compelled commercial speech advances a 
controversial ideology when the disclosed fact is germane to a 
contested norm.248  A purely factual compelled disclosure that 
advances a generally accepted norm is not constitutionally 
impermissible under the applicable uncontroversial requirement.249  
This is the case because by doing so, the government is not 
advancing its own opinion with respect to a dispute; rather, it is 
legitimizing the bona fide conventions of society at large.250  In this 
section, this Note will offer an analytical mechanism to assess the 
substantive information that was identified in the section prior. 
To begin, in order to determine whether a disclosed fact is 
germane to a contested normative value it is necessary to: (1) 
identify the disclosed fact, (2) identify the norm to which the 
disclosed fact is germane,251 (3) determine whether the norm is 
contested,252 and (4) weigh the informative force of the disclosed 
fact against the normative force of the contested value to which it is 
relevant.253  If the normative force of the compelled commercial 
speech outweighs its informative force, the compelled commercial 
speech is impermissibly controversial, and not subject to 
Zauderer’s less exacting scrutiny.254 
First, the Vermont labeling law255 mandates food producers to 
disclose which of their food products were produced by means of 
genetic modification.256  The information a GM food label conveys 
247.  See Goodman, supra note 19, at 550 (“We should be skeptical of disclosures 
that, even if purely factual, are designed to advance a controversial ideology as 
opposed to a generally accepted norm.”).  
248.  See Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion 
for a Preliminary Injunction at 31, Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-cv-117-cr 
(D. Vt. Sept. 11, 2014), ECF No. 33. 
249.  See id.; Goodman, supra note 19, at 550. 
250.  See Nation, supra note 48, at 329.  
251.  See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 19, at 553 (giving an example between a 
sugar level disclosure and the health norm relevant to the disclosure).  
252.  See Goodman, supra note 19, at 554 (“A usable definition of ‘controversial’ 
would have to be worked out, as courts have worked out other standards based on 
assessments of social consensus.”).  
253.  “What is important is both the nature of the value and the balance of 
contestable value with uncontestable fact.”  Goodman, supra note 19, at 549. 
254.  See Goodman, supra note 19, at 553—54 (“Somewhere along this 
continuum, the normative agenda overwhelms the informative agenda and more 
searching scrutiny would be warranted.”).  
255.  See supra Part I.B. 
256.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3043(b) (2014) (effective July 1, 2016).  
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is clear: based on an objective evaluation of the processes used to 
produce the label-bearing product, the labeled product was 
produced by means of genetic modification.  A GM food label 
broadcasts factual information because idiosyncratic value 
judgments do not form the criterion against which the food product 
is assessed for purposes of the labeling law.257 
The second step is to identify the norm to which the disclosed 
fact is germane.  Building on Professor Goodman’s “germaneness 
requirement,” this Note proposes that the concept of relevance, as 
set forth in Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, can be used 
to assess whether compelled commercial speech is germane to a 
normative value.258  In this vein, a disclosed fact is relevant to a 
normative value if the fact’s presence makes it more or less 
probable that subjective value judgments could influence the 
consumer’s decision to purchase or not to purchase the good to 
which the disclosed fact relates.259 
For example, in CTIA–The Wireless Association v. City & 
County of San Francisco, the defendant passed an ordinance, which 
required cell phone resellers to disclose to consumers that cell 
phones emit radiofrequency energy that is absorbed by the head 
and body.260  Under this Note’s proposal, the norm to which the 
radiofrequency disclosure is relevant is that it is good to reduce 
your exposure to radiofrequency energy for health reasons. 
GM food labeling is substantially similar to the disclosure in 
CTIA–The Wireless Association.  By mandating the food 
manufacturer or retailer to append a GM food label in “clear and 
conspicuous” words to a foodstuff’s container,261 the norm to which 
the GM food label is relevant is that it is allegedly good to reduce 
your consumption of GM foods out of, inter alia, health and 
environmental concerns.262  The choice to highlight the fact that the 
food is genetically modified reflects a normative value, namely, 
257.  See Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(“Even if one assumes that the State’s definition of ‘sexually explicit’ is precise, it is the 
State’s definition—the video game manufacturer or retailer may have an entirely 
different definition of this term.”). 
258.  See FED. R. EVID. 401 (establishing the test for relevant evidence). 
259.  See id.; see generally GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JAMES J. DUANE, 
WEISSENBERGER’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 401.3, at 99 (6th ed. 2009) (“The offered 
evidence need only make the fact sought to be proven more probable or less probable 
in order to satisfy Rule 401.”). 
260.  CTIA–Wireless Ass’n v. City & Cty.of San Francisco, 827 F.Supp.2d 1054 
(N.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d 494 F. App’x 752 (9th Cir. 2012).   
261.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3043(b) (2014) (effective July 1, 2016). 
262.  See id. § 3041(1)–(2). 
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GM foods are inherently different for the wrong reasons.263 
The third step is to ascertain the nature of the relevant norms, 
or in other words, a court must determine whether the relevant 
norms are contested, uncontested, or somewhere in the middle.  In 
so doing, it is important to appreciate the kind and strength of the 
norm at issue.264  Professor Goodman instructs that, in similar 
fashion to other areas of constitutional law, a court should look at 
the state of society at the time the issue arose.265  With respect to 
GM food labeling, the specific norm—the limitation of GM food 
consumption for health and environmental reasons—is contested as 
a matter of science and as a general matter of societal concern.266  
“One need not witness a ‘March Against Monsanto’ to grasp the 
point; the controversy is . . . on the face of Act 120.”267 
The last step is to weigh the informative force of the disclosed 
fact against the countervailing normative force.268  Specifically, the 
court should determine whether the normative force of the 
compelled disclosure overwhelms its informative force.269  In an 
effort to make this abstract assessment more concrete, this Note 
proposes that the concept of balancing probative value against 
unfair prejudice, as set forth in Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, can be used to assess whether the informative force of 
compelled commercial speech is stronger than the countervailing 
normative force.270 
In assessing the informative force of compelled commercial 
263.  See Goodman, supra note 19, at 546 (“The choice to include sugar on a 
nutritional label is arguably free of normative content. But the choice to highlight sugar 
on a front-of-pack label reflects a norm that sugar is special among ingredients.”).  
264.  See Goodman, supra note 19, at 549.   
265.  See Goodman, supra note 19, at 554 n.252 (discussing how the Court has 
considered “social consensus” with respect to defining “obscenity” and “cruel and 
unusual punishment” for constitutional purposes). 
266.  See Glass-O’Shea, supra note 21, at 10 (“Remarkably, even with this high 
level of [GE food] consumption, there have been no cases of demonstrated harm to 
humans from eating GM foods.”); Glass-O’Shea, supra note 21, at 12; James Shanahan 
et al., Attitudes About Agricultural Biotechnology & Genetically Modified Organisms, 
65 PUB. OPINION Q., no. 2, 267, 272 (2001).  
267.  Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a 
Preliminary Injunction at 31, Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-cv-117-cr (D. Vt. 
Sept. 11, 2014), ECF No. 33. 
268.  See Goodman, supra note 19, at 549 (“What is important is both the nature 
of the value and the balance of contestable value with uncontestable fact.”). 
269.  See Goodman, supra note 19, at 554 (“Somewhere along this continuum, the 
normative agenda overwhelms the informative agenda and more searching scrutiny 
would be warranted.”). 
270.  See FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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speech, a court could assess the “facial vagueness”271 of the 
commercial speech at issue and consumers’ need for the particular 
compelled commercial speech.272  In assessing the normative force 
of compelled commercial speech, a court can assess, in light of the 
identified normative value(s), the effect of the commercial speech 
on the probable behavior of consumers.273  This assessment 
implicates whether the compelled commercial speech at issue 
undermines the constitutional value of commercial speech—the 
circulation of accurate and useful information.274  As Professor 
Goodman explains, striking the right balance between the two 
forces is important—the normative force of compelled commercial 
speech could subsume its capacity to convey factual data by 
unfairly prejudicing or misleading consumers in some way.275 
Specifically, the normative force of a GM food label outweighs 
its informative force.  With respect to a GM food label’s 
informative force, the content of a GM food label is readily 
understandable.276  It conveys “factually straightforward”277 
information—the particular foodstuff to which the GM food label 
relates was produced by means of genetic modification.  
Notwithstanding a GM food label’s lack of facial vagueness, 
consumers’ need for this information is not dire for three reasons. 
First, the private sector offers food producers, such as Mr. 
Rickert,278 who want to voluntarily certify and market their 
products as non-GM the means to do so.279  In addition, some 
271.  Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law 
of Evidence?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 879, 884 (1988) (explaining how a judge can ascertain 
the probative value of logically relevant evidence). 
272.  Cf. Andrews v. State, 429 S.W.3d 849, 865 (Tex. App. 2014), reh’g overruled 
(May 6, 2014), petition for discretionary review refused (Aug. 20, 2014) (considering 
the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence along with the 
proponent’s need for that evidence). 
273.  Cf. id.; Imwinkelried, supra note 271, at 889–90 (stating that the focus is on 
the cognitive behavior of the jury during trial).  
274.  Goodman, supra note 19, at 553 (“Somewhere along this continuum, the 
normative agenda overwhelms the informative agenda and more searching scrutiny 
would be warranted.”). 
275.  Goodman, supra note 19, at 553; see also Goodman, supra note 19, at 552. 
276.  See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in judgment) (considering that the content of a country-of-
origin label was readily understandable).   
277.  Id.  
278.  See supra p. 1 and note 1. 
279.  About, Who We Are, NON-GMO PROJECT, 
http://www.nongmoproject.org/about/who-we-are/ [http://perma.cc/2XMK-EULQ] 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2015) (offering private non-GMO certification for food producers). 
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members of the private sector voluntarily label non-GM 
foodstuffs.280  Last, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration “is not 
aware of any information showing that foods derived by these new 
methods differ from other foods in any meaningful or uniform way, 
or that, as a class, foods developed by the new techniques present 
any different or greater safety concern than foods developed by 
traditional plant breeding.”281  Placing significance on the 
distinction between GM and non-GM foodstuffs is inapposite in 
light of the Federal Food and Drug Administration’s 1992 
Statement of Policy, and because it is far from the case that 
consumers have absolutely no idea as to which products derive 
from genetic modification. 
With respect to a GM food label’s normative force, the 
presence of a GM food label increases the possibility of consumers 
making consumption choices on improper bases.  The bases upon 
which a consumer can make a consumption choice with respect to a 
foodstuff that bears a GM food label are found in the labeling law 
itself.282  Specifically, a consumer could abstain from purchasing a 
GM foodstuff that is labeled as such for health or environmental 
reasons.283  The bases are improper for at least three reasons. 
First, whether or not GM foodstuffs are injurious to human 
health has yet to be answered with definitive scientific evidence.284  
Second, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s 1992 Statement 
of Policy explicitly states that GM foodstuffs pose no more risk to 
human health than non-GM foodstuffs.285  Last, the Food and Drug 
Administration specifically stated in the 1992 Statement of Policy 
that its laissez-faire approach to GM foodstuffs “does not 
individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human 
environment.”286  In this light, when faced with a GM food label, 
280.  See GMO: Your Right to Know, WHOLE FOODS MARKET, 
http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/gmo-your-right-know [http://perma.cc/LEW3-
9W6N] (last visited Oct. 1, 2015) (labeling all food products sold in its stores that are 
non-GM). 
281.  Statement of Policy - Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 
22984, 22991 (May 29, 1992) 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInform
ation/Biotechnology/ucm096095.htm#summary [http://perma.cc/EC2L-LJFC]. 
282.  See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3041(1)–(4). 
283.  See id. § 3041(1)–(2).  
284.  See Glass-O’Shea, supra note 21, at 10 (“Remarkably, even with this high 
level of [GM food] consumption, there have been no cases of demonstrated harm to 
humans from eating GM foods.”). 
285.  Statement of Policy - Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 
at 22991 (May 29, 1992).  
286.  Id. at 23,005; see also Glass-O’Shea, supra note 21, at 12. 
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making a consumption decision on the basis of either health or 
environmental concern is misplaced. 
Hence, the normative force of a GM food label outweighs its 
informative force—GM food labeling is not uncontroversial.  
Under Zauderer, this is constitutionally impermissible.  Given the 
current circumstances, a government-mandated GM food label, i.e., 
compelled commercial speech, reflects the side in the GM food 
debate to which the government adheres.  By dragooning 
consumers into making consumption choices that alights with its 
policy on GM foodstuffs, the government unilaterally dictates 
public opinion and private action with respect to a scientific and 
societal controversy.  In essence, GM food labeling advances a 
controversial ideological standpoint.  Therefore, GM food labeling, 
although purely factual, is controversial compelled commercial 
speech. Zauderer’s less exacting scrutiny does not apply. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Vermont cannot claim the benefit of Zauderer’s 
less exacting scrutiny.  Although GM food labeling is purely factual 
commercial speech, it is not uncontroversial.  GM food labeling is 
controversial because it advances the government’s perspective 
with respect to a controversial ideology.  By doing so, Vermont 
places the proper functioning of democracy at hazard and maims 
the autonomy interests of private individuals.  In essence, allowing 
Vermont to invoke the benefit of Zauderer’s rational-relationship 
rule with respect to controversial speech would eviscerate the 
constitutional value of commercial speech. 
This conclusion directly impacts Massachusetts and House Bill 
369.  If House Bill 369 becomes law in Massachusetts, 
Massachusetts should expect to defend the constitutionality of 
House Bill 369 under a more exacting level of judicial scrutiny.  
Whether Massachusetts can successfully do so is called into doubt 
by existing precedent.287  In this vein, House Bill 369 should not 
pass, since it would probably succumb to the pressure of the 
constitutional crucible. 
At the same time, Massachusetts could attempt to claim the 
benefit of Zauderer’s less exacting scrutiny by showing that state-
mandated labeling of genetically modified food is not controversial.  
In light of this Note’s proposed framework, Massachusetts could 
287.  See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding 
that Vermont could not compel manufacturers of dairy products to disclose whether 
their products contain rGBH, a type of GE hormone).  
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satisfy this requirement by showing that GM foods present 
different or greater safety concerns than non-GM foods; thus, the 
informative value of state-mandated GM food labels would 
outweigh any normative force.  It would be necessary for 
Massachusetts to fund scientific research that supplants the Food 
and Drug Administration’s 1992 Statement of Policy to succeed in 
doing this.288  Therefore, leading-edge scientific conclusions could 
be the key to the legal viability of House Bill 369 under Zauderer’s 
less exacting scrutiny.289 
288.  Statement of Policy - Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 
22984, 22991 (May 29, 1992).  “The central role of the science community in funding 
decisions diminishes when the broader community becomes involved in decisions on 
the application of technology.”  Steven Goldberg, The Reluctant Embrace: Law and 
Science in America, 75 GEO. L. J. 1341, 1368 (1987). 
289.  Goldberg, supra note 288, at 1368 (“From the railroad to the automobile to 
the airplane and beyond, legal doctrines have been shaped by technology and have, in 
turn, shaped technology itself.”).  
